INTRODUCTION
The classical model of exchange under perfect competition is the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model. The existence of an equilibrium for this model was proved in Arrow-Debreu [2] and McKenzie [25] . The heart of the proof of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium result is an equilibrium theorem for an abstract economy given in Debreu [9] , which in turn is a generalization of the Nash [30] noncooperative equilibrium result. The prominent features of the classical model are: First, its finiteness, i.e., both the set of agents and the number of commodities are finite. Second, agents behave in a transitive and complete fashion, i.e., agents' preferences are assumed to be transitive and complete and consequently are representable by utility functions.
Three major extensions of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model have been made. The first is a generalization of the set of agents to a measure space of agents by Aumann [3, 4] .
Aumann argued that the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model is clearly at odds with itself as the finitude of agents means that each agent is able to exercise some influence. Aumann resolves this problem by assuming that the set of agents is an atomless measure space, and consequently the influence of each agent is "negligible." In this sense the Aumann model, captures precisly the meaning of perfect competition. Bewley [6] provides the second major extension of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model. Bewley amends the classical model to permit the dimensionality of the commodity space to be infinite. This extension is of great importance since infinite dimensional commodity spaces arise very naturally in general equilibrium analysis. In particular, an infinite dimensional commodity space may be desirable in problems involving infinite time horizons, uncertainty about an infinite number of states of the world, or infinite varieties of commodity characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of an equilibrium in a game theoretic setting (abstract economy), a la Debreu [9] and Shafer-Sonnenschein
[35] with a broader structure. In fact, our setting is general enough to include the three major extensions of the classical model mentioned above. It encompasses both the Aumann [3, 4] economy of perfect competition and the nonordered preferences setting of Mas-Cole11 1271. Moreover, since the dimensionality of the strategy space may be infinite it contains Bewley-type [6] results and may be useful in obtaining existence results for economies with a measure space of agents and infinitely many commodities. It also provides an answer to the question posed in Khan [IS], as to whether equilibria in abstract economies exist in this general setting. In fact, the paper has been inspired by Kahn's work on nonatomic games with an infinite dimensional strategy space.
Our generalization of the Debreu-Shafer-Sonnenschein existence of an equilibrium result for an abstract game or economy with a measure space of agents has several implications. First it extends the Aumann [4] and Schmeidler [33] results, to allow agents' preferences to be both nonordered and interdependent (i.e., it allows for externalities in consumption). Second, it may be seen as a first step in providing a synthesis of the Aumann [4] model of perfect competition with the Bewley [6] model of an infinite dimensional commodity space. Finally, our result extends the theorems of Khan Cl83 and Schmeidler [32] on the existence of Nash equilibria with a continuum of players to a more general class of games where agents' preferences need not be ordered, and therefore need not be representable by utility functions; it also extends the KhanVohra [20] equilibrium in abstract economies result to infinite dimensional strategy spaces. The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 contains some notation and definitions. The main existence theorem of the paper as well as its relationship with the literature is given in Section 3. Several technical Lemmata and Facts needed for the proof of the main existence theorem are concentrated in Section 4. The proof of the main result is given in Section 5. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 6. such that for almost all t E T, sup{ llx/l: XE 4(t)} < g(f). We now detine the concept of a Caratheodory-type Selection which roughly speaking combines the notions of continuous selection and measurable selection. Let Z be a topological space and d: T x Z + 2 ' be a nonempty valued correspondence. A function f: TX Z 4 Y is said to be a Caratheodory-type .seleclion from 4 if ,f(t. r) E +( f, z) for all (1, z) E T x Z and f'( , r) is measurable for all I E 2 and,f'(t, . ) is continuous for all t E T. (2) X: T+ 2" is a strategy correspondence; (3) P: T+ L,(p, X) -+ 2 Ihs' is a preference correspondence such that P(t, x)cX(t) for all(t, x)~TxL~(p, X);
Observe that since P is a mapping from TX L,(p, X) to 2": we have allowed for interdependent preferences. The interpretation of these preference correspondences is that 1' F P(f, x) means that agent t strictly prefers y to x(t) if the given strategies of other agents are fixed. Note that L,(p, X) is the set of all joint strategies. As in [32] and [20] we endow L,(p, X) throughout the paper with the weak topology. This signifies a natural form of myopic behaviour on the part of the agents. In particular, an agent has to arrive at his/her decisions on the basis of knowledge of only finitely many (average) numerical characteristics of the joint strategies.
An equilibrium for f is an x* E L1 (pi, X) such that for almost all t in T the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) .u*(t) E A(t, x*) and (ii) P(r, ,u*)nA(t, x*)=@.
The Main Theorem
We can now state the assumptions needed for the proof of the main theorem.
(A.1 ) (T, z, p) is a finite, positive, complete, separable measure space. ' (A.2) X: T + 2" is a correspondence such that:
(a) it is integrably bounded and for all t E T, X(t) is a nonempty, convex, closed subset of R';
' is a correspondence such that:
is convex, closed, and nonempty; We can now state our main result. ' The reascm we assume that (T, I. p) is a separable measure space is that we want L,(& X) to be separable. Let us now compare our assumptions with those of Khan-Vohra [20] . Apart from the measurability assumptions, all other conditions are identical. In particular, Khan-Vohra assume that the correspondences X, A, P have measurable graphs rather than assuming lower measurability. Therefore, our main existence theorem is closely related to theirs but the methods of proof are different. Specifically, the Khan-Vohra approach follows the Shafer-Sonnenschein construction of a utility indicator. Our proof is based on selection-type arguments given in Yannelis-Prabhakar [39] . The approach adopted by Khan-Vohra does not extend to infinite dimensional strategy spaces. It fails due to the fact that the convex hull of an U.S.C. correspondence in an infinite dimensional strategy space need not be U.S.C. (see[3 1, Ex. 27, p. 721). In contrast, our selection type arguments can be directly extended to separable Banach strategy spaces (see Remark 6.4 Apart from the above differences we may also note that in [21] it was assumed that the measure space is a locally compact subset of a metric space with a countably generated c-field. The latter assumption is stronger than (A.l). Moreover, the measurability assumptions in [21] and [23] were made on the graphs of the correspondences X, P, A. Furthermore, notice that our main existence result extends the equilibrium theorems for abstract economies in Toussaint [37] and Yannelis-Prabhakar [38, 391 to a measure space of agents. Also, it generalizes the result in Khan [IS] and Schmeidler [32] to nonordered preferences. Finally, it should be noted that a different approach to equilibrium in abstract games with a continuum of agents has been followed by Green [ 151 and Mas-Cole11 [28] .
We can now turn to some technical lemmata needed for the proof of our main result. is open in X and .u,eE since yoe$(x,)nBn V. Let U-AnE.
Then U is open in X and .~,EU. To complete the proof we must show that U c K. Let 2 E U, then z E E and -EA.
Since L z E E, $(z) n B n V # 0. Choose w E e(z) n B n V. Then W)E A x Bc G, and so WE#(Z). Hence, w~qS(z)nI(/(z)n V, i.e., ZE K. Consequently, x0 E UC K, and this completes the proof of the Lemma. 
ProoJ:
The proof is trivial. Simply note that by virtue of Fact 3.2, for every opensubset VofX, {t~T:~(t)nV#~}={t~T:cl~(t)nV#~~.
We now state a Caratheodory-type selection result whose proof can be found in Kim-PrikryyYannelis [24, Theorem 3.23.
CARATHEODORY-TYPE SELECTION THEOREM. Let (T, 7, p) be a complete measure space, Z be a complete, separable metric space. Let 4: T x Z + 2 Iw' be a convex (possibly empty) valued correspondence such that:
(i) q5( . , ) is lower measurable, (ii) for each t E T, #(t, . ) is 1.s.c.
Let
U={(t, x)ETxZ:&t, x)#@) and for each tET, let U'= {XEZ: (t, X)E U} andfor each XGZ, let V,= {tE T: (t, X)E U}. Then there exists a Caratheodory-type selection ,from r&o, i.e., there exists a function f: U -+ [WI such that f(t, x) E $( t, x) for all (t, x) E U and for each XEZ,f( ., x) is measurable on U, andfor each t E T, f(t, ) is continuous on U'. Furthermore, f ( . , . ) is jointly measurable. 1, y,) E G,, i.e., .r,, E @(.u,,) . We must show that J' E Q(x). Since y,, E a(~,,), we have that v,,(r) c&t, I,,) for almost all t E T. By Corollary 17.2 in [ 17, p. 1541, there exists z,,( ) E con U,rOa ,2 J,~~( . ) such that z,,( . ) converges in norm to J(. ). Without loss of generality we may assume that z,,(t) converges in norm to I (otherwise pass to a subsequence) for all TV r\S where S is a negligible set of agents. Fix an agent t in r\S. Since &t, . ) is u.s.c., for every small positive number E there exists II such that for all 11" 3 n we have that &t, x,,") z&t, .u) + EB. But then con U ,,o 2 n d( t, .Y,,~) G &t, X) + EB which implies that z,,(t) E d( t, s) + EB and so JI( t) E &t, X) + EB. Therefore, v(t) E &t, X) by letting F converge to zero. Since t is any arbitrary agent in r\S, y(t) g&t, s) for almost all t in T, i.e., J'E G(s). Hence, G, is weakly closed, as was to be shown. This completes the proof of the lemma.
PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
Define $: TX L,(p, X) + 2"' by $( t, s) = con P( t, s) for all (t, s) E T x L,(p, X). By Lemma 4.1 for each t E T, $( t, . ) has an open graph in L,(p, X) x Iw' where L ,(~l, X) is endowed with the weak topology. Define (1: TxL,(p, X)+2"
by Il(t, s)=A(t, .\-)n$(t, X) for all (t, S)E T x L,(p, X). Then 0 is convex valued and it follows from Lemma 4.2 that for each TV T, O(t, ) is 1,s.~. in the sense that the set (SE L,(p, A'): fI( t. X) r\ Vf 0 ) is weakly open in L,(p, X) for every open subset V of (w'. Moreover, it follows from assumption (A.~)(c) that 0: TX L,(p, A') --f 2"' is lower measurable. Let U = ((t, X) E TX L,(p, A'): q5( t, x) # $3). For each .v~L,(p,x), let U,={tET:0(t,.v)#IZJ) and for each tET, let U' = {X E L,(p, X): 0( t, x) # 0). It follows from the Caratheodory-type selection theorem that there exists a function ,f: U+ R' such that f( t, x) E Q(t, X) for all (t, X) E U and for each x E L,(p, X), .fl , X) is measurable on U,. and for each t E T, ,f( t, . ) is continuous on U'. .Y* E @(x*), i.e., x*(t) E &t, .I-*) for almost all t in T. Suppose that for a nonnegligible set of agents S, (t, .u*) E U for all t E 5'. Then by the definition of y5, x*(t)=f(t, -Y*)E Ott, s*) c con P(t, -Y*) for all YES, a contradiction to (A.4)( b). Therefore, (t, .Y*) $ U for almost all t in T and consequently for almost all TV T, .~*(t)eA(t, -u*) and t3(t, .u*)=con P(l, x*)n A(t, .~*)=a which implies that P( t, .u*) n A( t, .u*) = 0, i.e., s* is an equilibrium for f. This completes the proof of the main theorem.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS Remark 6.1. Our main existence theorem can be used to prove directly the existence of a competitive equilibrium for an economy with a continuum of agents whose preferences may be interdependent and need not be transitive or complete (see for instance Khan-Vohra [20, Theorem 3, p. 1371). Therefore, an extension of the Aumann [4] and Schmeidler [33] results to economies with non-ordered and interdependent preferences can be obtained. Moreover, combining such a result with the techniques used in Armstrong-Richter [ 11, a competitive equilibrium existence theorem for the coalitional preference framework adopted in [l] seems to be easily obtained as' well. Remark 6.2. Note that in the Aumann [4] model the convexity assumption on preferences is not required, since the Lyapunov theorem convexities the aggregate demand set. However, without transitivity and completeness the convexity assumption on preferences cannot be relaxed (see Mas-Cole11 [27, p. 2431). Moreover, even if preferences are transitive, complete, and interdependent, the convexity assumption still cannot be relaxed. In fact, as KhanVohra
[20] pointed out, with externalities in consumption there is no convexifying effect on aggregation. Therefore, it appears that the convexity assumption (A.4)(b) cannot be relaxed in models with a continuum of agents and interdependent preferences. has a nonempty interior for all (t, x) E U (see [24, Theorem 3.21). The proof of the main existence result remains the same. One only needs to check that from assumption (A.3)(b') it follows that the correspondence 8: T x L , (,u, X) -+ 2 ' (defined in Sec. 5) has a nonempty interior in X(t) and consequently a trivial modification of our Caratheodory-type selection theorem assures that there exists a Caratheodory selection ,f: U -+ Y from 8,,,. The rest of the proof remains unchanged.
Rrnmrk 6.5. In a subsequent paper we hope to show how the main existence result of this paper can be used to obtain a generalization of Bewley's [6] result to economies with a measure space of agents. The fact that the abstract economy approach can be used to prove Bewley's existence result (recall that the set of agents in the Bewley model is finite) has been demonstrated already in Toussaint [37] . However, in an economy with a measure space of agents, if consumption sets are norm compact, one can prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium very easily. First, one can convert the exchange economy into an abstract economy (this can be done as in [20] and [34] ). Next, the price space can be endowed with the weak* topology to obtain bilinear forms that are jointly continuous. Our main theorem can then be used to ensure the existence of an equilibrium for the abstract economy. It is straightforward to show that the existence of an equilibrium for the abstract economy implies the existence of a competitive equilibrium for the exchange economy. However, without norm compact consumption sets a rather major difficulty needs to be overcome.
The nature of the difficulty introduced by consumption sets which need not be norm compact appears to be quite fundamental. First, recall that in economies with finitely many agents and infinitely many commodities one usually constructs a suitable family of truncated subeconomies and proves the existence of a competitive equilibrium in each subeconomy. Hence, a net of competitive equilibrium allocations for the truncated economies is obtained. It is easy to verify that the set of all feasible allocations lies on an order interval which is compact (typically in the topology that the commodity space is endowed with), Thus, one can extract convergent subnets of competitive equilibrium allocations whose limit is a competitive equilibrium for the original economy. However, even in [w' if the set of agents is an atomless measure space a similar argument does not readily apply, since the set of all feasible allocations is not compact in any topology. Nevertheless, in this case the FatouPSchmiedler Lemma can be used to extract convergent subsequences of competitive equilibrium allocations whose limit is a competitive equilibrium allocation for the original economy (see, e.g., [4, 16, 331) . However, since an infinite dimensional version of the Fatou Lemma is not yet available, it is not clear whether with infinitely many commodities and agents one can dispense with some type of compactness on consumption sets and still show that a competitive equilibrium exists. This seems to be an important open question.
